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It is quite impossible to discuss any questions of such 
complexity and moment as those involved in the present 
Spanish struggle without inviting serious difference of 
opinion. This pamphlet is not to be taken as repre· 
senting any views other than those of the writer. If 
it arouses discussion, it will have served its purpose. 
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SPAIN 
. Battleground of Democracy 
by Hubert C. Herring 
The Spanish civil war belongs to the world. It is financed, 
in part, by nations of two hemispheres. Its troops are aug-
mented by volunteers from many countries. Its issues are 
world issues. It points a universal question: Shall constitu-
tional democracy or dictatorial autocracy prevail? 
The attempt to localize the fight, and to prevent a general 
European war grows daily more difficult. The attempt may 
or may not succeed, but in a larger sense the issues in this 
Spanish struggle cannot be isolated. 
The purpose of this pamphlet is to remind its readers of 
some of the things which have happened, which are happening 
in Spain, things which bear upon the struggles of believers in 
democracy everywhere. 
Spain's ,Century of Struggle 
We must remind ourselves that the present struggle ;s only 
the latest chapter in a century of bitter struggle. 
t<Your vote must be an arrow into the heart of the monarchy" 
- that was the battle-cry of the revolutionary forces in the 
election of April, 1931. Spain responded, and drove the arrow 
straight. Alfonso XIII fled to Paris, and the second 'republic 
was proclaimed. 
The bloodless revolution of 1931 was not the work of an 
hour or a year. Spain's struggle for free institutions has been 
fought for over a hundred years. It began in 1808 with the 
Napoleonic invasion. Napoleon brought the fierce new ideas 
of the French revolution; those ideas upset the old absolutism 
and yielded the Constitution of 1812 which, through a na-
tional parliament, gave the people a check upon the monarchy. 
But the creation of a national congress, the Cortes, did not 
achieve this end. The first reform movement was suppressed 
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in 1814 by Ferdinand VII, restored to the throne on the down- . 
fall of Napoleon. Ferdinand tore up the constitution, jailed 
the liberals, and restored the old despotism. 
The history of Spain has, since then, been the story of the 
struggle between the despots and the liberals. 
In 1820, an army junta jailed Ferdinand and restored the 
1812 Constitution. But the absolutists of Europe would not 
permit such treason. The Holy Alliance-dominated by the 
emperors of Prussia and Austria and the Tsar of Russia-met 
at Verona in 1823, and sent a French army to overturn the 
Spanish disturbers of the royal peace. Ferdinand was again 
restored. . 
The bitter struggles of the Carlist wars blocked reform, but 
by 1868 the feudal alliance of Crown and Church was con-
fronted by a resolute republican force. From Paris, Victor 
Hugo cheered them on: rrT he papacy and absolutism have 
leagued to annihilate the nation. If Spain is reborn a mon-
archy, she will be insignificant. If reborn a republic, she will 
be great." 
Finally, in 1873 Spain actually became a republic. The 
democratic forces of the world exulted. But this first Spanish 
republic was prematurely launched. Divided counsels lashed 
it stern and keel, and it sank within the year. 
So it came to pass that the Bourbons were given another half 
century of life (1873-1931), but their power was crumbling. 
It was weakened bv the war with the United States in 1898. 
It was shaken by the Riff campaign in 1921. It was under-
mined by the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera from 1923 to 
1929. The indignation and the power of the people grew, 
and had Alfonso not fled in 1931, Spain would have become 
a shambles. 
Republic Again Established 
The adoption of the Constitution of 1931 represented the 
fulfillment of the hopes and struggles of a century. It exuded 
"the cool aroma of Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Jeffer-
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son," to quote a phrase of John Gunther's. It was closely mod-
eled on Mexico's Queretaro Constitution of 1917. The child 
had taught the mother. The Constitution proclaimed Spain 
to be tea democratic republic of workers of all classes." 
But the proclamation of a republic and the adoption of a 
constitution again settled nothing. The old feudalism re-
mained. The village bosses - the caciques-still held their 
power, the Church still controlled wealth and education, the 
monarchists still dominated the army, the wealthy few still 
owned the land. The republican forces, inexperienced, di-
vided and ineffective, presented no solid front. Therefore the 
reactionaries seized the very machinery which the republicans 
had created, and in November, 1933 were in control of the 
Cortes. Again reaction reigned . • 
The clerical leader, Gil Robles, became outspoken in his 
contempt for democracy. ttWe must move," he said, ((towards 
a new state, and for that duties and sacrifices must be im pOJed. 
What matter if it nzeanJ shedding blood? . .. We need an in-
tegral pou'er, and that is what we are seeking . ... Democracy 
is for us not an end but a means to go on to the conquest of a 
new state . . When the monzent comes, either Parliament will 
sttbmit, or we shall make it disappear." 
Under such pressure, the life of the republic rapidly disin-
tegrated. The Lerroux cabinet set up in October, 1934, was 
dominated by men whose ideas of government and social or-
ganization were colored by religious bigotry, military dog-
matism, and feudal arrogance. All signs pointed to a typical. 
fascist adventure in which a powerful few dominate a close-
knit state at the expense of the disinherited many. The work-
ers struck blindly, desperately, in Madrid and Catalonia and 
Asturias. The revolt was put down by mercenaries from 
Morocco. There were at least 2,000 dead, many thousands in 
pnson. . 
1935 saw further preparations for a fascist state. Gil Robles 
and his clerical group, working with the army, were preparing 
for the repetition of the experience of Germany and Italy. 
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People's Front Formed 
But the people of Spain saw these portents - and were 
aroused. In opposition to the growing fascist strength a new 
coalition, the People' s Front, was formed. It brought together 
a strange collection of diverse elements, middle class repub-
licans, socialists of various hues, communists, and many of the 
anarchists - all united by the common demand for constitu-
tional democratic government. Their platform included arn-
nesty for political prisoners, the purging of the police force, 
credits and lower rents for the peasants, protection for the 
shopkeepers, minimum wage legislation, public works for the 
unem pI oyed, regulation of banks, and modification of the 
taxin g system. 
The election of February 16, 1936 took place under the 
threat of civil war. But despite wholesale corruption at the 
polls, the People's Front won 268 of the 473 seats in the 
Cortes. The new government took office in February, 1936. 
Thirty thousand political prisoners, victims of the October, 
1934 riQts, were set free. 
The People's Front was not a «communist" government as 
has been so often claimed. It was simply a republican gov-
ernment. Its one uniting enthusiasm was for the republic as 
against a fascist dictatorship. Manuel Azana's Left Republi-
cans were represented by 81 deputies; Martinez Barrio's Re-
publican Union by 36, the Left Republicans of Catalonia by 29. 
These were all typically middle-of-the-road political groups, 
not radicals. 
There were 98 deputies representing the socialists, but of 
these fully one-half represented the more conservative so-
cialists of Indalecio Prieto. The communists had 16 seats. It 
must be made clear that at least three-fifths of the ruling bloc 
were simply liberal believers in the republic. 
But Spain's ccNew Deal" was not promised an-easy course. 
From the start, its way was beset with trouble. It was intent 
upon remaking Spain. The Old Dealers were equally intent 
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upon restoring feudal Spain-the Spain in which a few people 
who lived in castles owned all the land, ran all the govern-
ment, officered the army - and were blessed in it by the 
Church. The masses were angry and impatient. The workers 
waged bitter strikes, while the leaders of the old regime 
claimed reprisals through assassination and intrigue. 
The issue, so sharply drawn, had to be submitted to the de-
I cision of ballots or bullets. 11he new government had already 
won the contest of ballots, won it fairly and against terri.fic 
odds. There was nothing left to the reactionaries save the 
appeal to bullets. Hence, the coterie of obstinate generals-
backed by the princes of finance and by the Church - decided 
upon bullets to regain the government. 
The civil war which broke in July, 1936 is, therefore, the 
latest chapter in Spain's hundred year struggle for national 
integrity and democratic hope. 
The Long Shadow of the Middle Ages 
We must understand the things which are happening in the 
light of th~ deyelopment of Spain during the Middle Ages. 
The century-long revolt is the struggle of the Spanish people 
to shake off the heritage of feudalism. Spain struggles to get 
out of the medieval armor that no longer fits. It is no new 
struggle. To remove the fetters of this same feudalism, Crom-
well's army marched against Charles, Washington's colonials 
besieged Cornwallis, and Paris stormed the Bastille. What 
is unique in Spain is the lateness and duration of the struggle. 
Feudal Spain grew out of the expulsion of the Moors, who 
since 711 A.D. had dwelt in the land. Like their present 
descendants, they came at the behest of one Spanish faction 
to fight the government. But they graduall y gained control 
in their own right. These early Moors brought a new and 
higher culture. They created a prosperous Spain by vast irri-
gation, a beautiful Spain with skilled handicrafts, a cultured 
Spain with great universities. Moorish Spain was one of the 
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Rebel domination at the beginning of the year. 
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broad highways over which Europe traveled from the Graeco-
Roman world to the golden days of the Renaissance. 
During this Moorish period, however, the Spanish lords 
kept their strongholds in the northern mountains. Gradually 
they consolidated their power in separate states: Asturias, 
Leon, Castile, Navarre, Aragon. With the twin weapons of 
the Army and the Inquisition, they finally swept down upon 
the strongholds of the Moors. The 'Alhambra, citadel and 
temple of Moorish pride, fell in 1492. With this victory the 
feudal lords of Spain ushered in the most glittering and arro-
gant feudalism that Europe has known. 
In the year that the Alhambra fell, Christopher Columbus 
discovered America, claiming a new empire in the name of 
their majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella. Thus Spain faced 
the dual and contradictory task of completing the expulsion of 
her most industrious and inventive citizens, the Moors, while 
building a colonial empire which needed those very qualities 
which they possessed. 
The annexation of the American empire offered Spain her 
fateful choice. With the resources of America to draw upon 
. she might have become the workshop of the world. Spain 
had all the metals and the fuels. But she lacked any deeper 
incentive than the accumulation of gold for luxury's sake. 
The gold of Peru was destined first to enrich the Spanish em-
pire, and then to corrupt and destroy it. 
The history of Spain in the 16th, 17th, 18th centuries is 
the record of a lazy, lustful, uninventive feudalism. During 
this period, Britain, France and the United States laid the 
foundations for another kind of prosperity. Without easy 
gold, they turned to invention and industry. With easy gold, 
Spain marked time, and degenerated. Even her war machine 
proved vulnerable. The 19th century saw the loss of her 
empire. The process of stripping away that empire was begun 
by Drake off Plymouth in 1588, and was completed by Dewey 
in Manila Bay in 1898. 
But the thick shell of feudalism remained even after the 
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empire had been stripped away. Indeed, this feudalism re-
mained after Alfonso XIII fled in 1931. It persisted in the 
persons of those lords of great lineage and showy titles who 
owned the land and the houses, and exacted toll from the 
sweating millions who worked their lands. It persisted in an 
arrogant Church, captained by princes of religion who lived 
in houses of hewn stone and were not moved by the afHictions 
of the people. It persisted in the unholy alliance between 
the Church, the nobility and the rulers of business. The habits 
of the feudal mind were the same under an empire and under 
a republic. There was no identity of interest with the com-
mon man. 
If it were to be successful, the Spanish republic must curb 
those feudal powers, and bring justice to the disinherited. This 
the leaders of the republic hoped to achieve, but their efforts 
were interrupted by the civil war of 1936. 
The Land 
It is impossible to understand the Spanish struggle without 
understanding the fatal injustice of her land system. 
Spain, the second largest state in Western Europe, has a 
population of 23,500,000. Spain's territory is about three-
fourths that of Texas and her population four times as large. 
The primary barrier to a larger population is poverty with 
its accompanying high mortality, and the primary cause of 
Spain's poverty is her desperate agrarian situation. The Span-
iards are the most land-hungry people in Europe. (CAll other 
problems in Spain," .writes Raymond E. Crist, «fade into in-
significance besides this one of agrarian reform. According 
as it is or is not satisfactorily solved, millions of people either 
will achieve a standard of living to which human beings are 
justified in aspiring . or will continue to vegetate in illiteracy, 
misery and squ~lor." Three-quar.ters of the Spanish people 
are dependent directly or indirectly upon agrirulture for a liv-
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ing, but the land is distributed in such unequal fashion as to 
give a decent living to not more than ten per cent. 
Spain is not a fertile country. Two-thirds of Spain is a 
plateau som.e 2,600 feet high, the great meseta central} sur-
rounded and crossed by mountain ranges. In the North, the 
Pyrenees and Cantabrians; in the South, the Sierra Morena; 
across the plateau, the Sierra de Guadarrama, scene of an early 
Verdun of the civil war. 
Spain is not only mountainous; half of it is arid. The North 
is temperate and moist, but the South is swept by torrid winds 
from Africa. Each summer threatens the meagre crops with 
drought. It is estimated that 45 per cent of the land is barren, 
another 45 per cent moderately fertile, and only 10 per cent 
really fertile. 
Maldistribution of Land 
The natural difficulties, however, do not explain the Spanish 
land-hunger. The basic causes are historical and social. The 
dry climate of Southern Spain confronted the Moors a thou-
sand years ago as it confronts the Andalusians today. But 
the Moors developed widespread irrigation projects, and sup-
ported a population of some 30,000,000. The feudal recon-
quest of Spain by the northern princes and the subsequent 
wars, for the glory of Rome and the Hapsburgs, laid waste 
the manpower and skill needed to maintain an advanced agri-
culture. By 1750, the population had fallen to 8,000,000. A 
large part of the cooperative irrigation schemes were allowed 
to decay, the soil deteriorated, and Spanish agriculture de-
clined. This situation still prevails. Modern methods of dry 
farming and crop rotation are practically unknown in the 
Spanish countryside. 
The heart of this persistent backwardness and land hunger 
is the unsocial distribution of land. The great estates have 
been handed down from one generation to another of the 
ruling families, from the· days bf the Middle Ages. 
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Modern methods and 
democratic practices 
are rare in Spanish 
agriculture. 
Dftlwings b, HelioJ Gomez 
Frank Hanighen reports on the "fantastically undemocratic 
system of landlordism. . .. Some 1,200 families own more 
than 40% of all the agricultural land of Spain. . .. Another 
20% belongs to some 75,000 families. In certain provinces, 
such as Andalusia and Estramadura, over 90% of the land is 
held by a few individuals. The three greatest landowners of 
Spain, the Dukes of Medina, Penaranda and Alba, hold . : . 
close to half a million acres. . .. These owners, it should be 
stressed, are principally absentee landlords. They live in 
Spain's great cities, or abroad, and either lease their land or 
have it worked by bailiffs. . .. The peasant often is but the 
fourth link in a chain. First, the landowner; second, the 
leaser; third, the tenant; and fourth, the subtenant." 
The latifundia domination in Spain is summarized in a 
statement from the Foreign Policy Association: CC67% of the 
land is owned by 2 % of the landowners." 
The small landholders are so burdened by taxes, rents, and 
feudal dues that they cannot make the necessary agricultural 
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improvements. The size of their tiny plots is itself a barrier 
to scientific farming. Any improvements they did make would 
revert to the original owner at the end of the lease--and leases 
are usually short and easily terminated. On the other hand, 
the absentee landlords find it easier and more profitable to buy 
more land than to develop the land already owned. Many 
grandees have turned fertile lands into wasteful grazing 
ranges. Thus peasants in desperate need have no opportunity 
to develop the land, while the landowners find no incentive 
to do so. 
Even more poverty-ridden than the small peasants are the 
landless peasants. There are, it is estimated, some 3,000,000 
of these. In these wretched ranks are both the Catalan 
sharecropper of the North and the Andalusian day-laborer on 
the Southern one-crop plantations. Wages are pitifully low, 
ranging from 14 to 60 cents a day. Since employment is sea-
sonal and spasmodic, even this miserable wage is forthcoming 
only during a few months of the year. The regular winter 
unemployment, without public relief, brings starvation an-
nually to agricultural workers. Even summer employment is 
uncertain, for drought or rain may wipe out ·the crops. Many 
families in Southern Spain live in caves and eat roots and 
grasses. 
Agrarian Reform 
The chief hope for the relentless land hunger in Spain lies 
in the division of the large estates among the peasants. The 
people must be settled on the land by the government, and 
means provided for its cultivation on scientific lines. There 
is no substitute solution for the agrarian problem. The Catho-
lic credit organizations functioned for years in ru~al Spain, 
but while the extension of credit increased the domain of the 
Church, it did nothing to appease the hunger of the people 
for more and better land. On the basic question of land re ... 
form, it was inevitable that the Church should stand with the 
other great landowners. 
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When Alfonso fled in 1931, it was clear that a suc'cessful 
republican government must take steps to alleviate the condi-
tion of the peasants. Only so could it keep their support. But 
the government hesitated to attack this knotty problem with 
vigor. The Cortes passed laws providing for the expropriation 
of uncultivated land and that belonging to the exiled monar-
chists, with compensation for all save feudal holders. An 
agricultural survey was instituted. Yet the essential step was 
not taken: the land was not divided. This played into the 
hands of the Right parties, who captured the 1933 election-
and prevented the division of the estates. By the end of 1934 
only about 8,000 aCres had been distributed, and some 2,000 
families resettled. 
Not until the victory of the Popular Front in February, 1936 
was the land reform program seriously launched. Between 
February and July, 1936 some 100,000 families had actually 
been granted land. The new government was determined to 
meet the pressing need of the disinherited farm workers. Spain 
started down the road taken by France in the 18th century when 
the great estates were divided to provide a basis for economic 
progress and democracy. She was beginning to banish the 
blight of feudalism from the soil. 
The attempt of clerical and fascist forces to block this road 
of agrarian reform by the present rebellion may postpone the 
modernization of the Spanish economy. But it is not guess-
work to say that there can be no peace in Spain until the 
peasants win the right to land. They are forced by their con-
ditions of life to struggle for the soil. 
The Church 
No one can assess the meaning of the present crisis in Spain 
'. without understanding the role of the Church from feudal 
times down to the present. 
Spain is Catholic, devoutly and passionately. Evert those 
who fight against the Catholic clergy are often Catholic in 
conviction and feeling. 
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The Church looms larger in Spain than in any other land 
today. It is probable that a greater proportion of the popula-
tion remains faithful than even in Italy. There are fully 
100,000 clergy or members ot the religious orders. There is 
1 priest to every 900 of the population, a figure to be com-
pared with Italy's 1 to every 20,000. 
The Spanish Church has always been in politics, from the 
Inquisition four centuries ago to its contemporary political 
movement, ,llcci6n Popular. Even its most devoted friends 
will not deny the fact. Moreover, the union of Church and 
State has prevailed since the Middle Ages. The union is. based 
on the interlocking character of the nobility and the ecclesiasti-
cal hierarchy. The princes of the Church and the princes of 
the State are kinsmen by blood and by tastes. 
The Inquisition, inaugurated in 1478, was the religious arm 
of the monarchy in subduing the Moors and Jews. With equal 
accuracy it could be said that the State was the secular arm of 
the Church in suppressing heretics. This intimate connection 
has persisted. The Church remained the buttress of the mon-
archy. This service was recognized in the paynlent of annual 
tribute to the Church, from State income. 
Furthermore, the economic power of the Church inevitably 
tied the Church to those who would protect accumulated and 
inherited power. The Church has been, and still is, the chief 
capitalist, landlord, and banker of Spain. It is charged with 
holding one-third of the natiop.al wealth. As the greatest land-
owner, it naturally has opposed all land reform. In the re-
curring struggles between the landless and the landed, the clerical 
hierarchy stood with the rich and powerful. The landless 
peasants swelled the ranks of the anti-clerical. 
The Religious Orders 
As an investor in industrial enterprises and as the leading-
banker, the Church opposed the organization of labor for im-· 
proved bargaining status. Thus, the industrial workers learned 
to know the Church as their enemy. The decisive vote of 
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February, 1936 against the parties of the Right and against 
such clerical leaders as Gil Robles meant one thing: that the 
industrial worker was definitely anti-clerical. 
The «religious orders" such as the Jesuits are responsible 
for much of the fury directed against the Church. These 
orders grew rich and powerful. Attempts to limit their num-
ber and wealth were defeated again and again: In 1851 
Madrid entered into a concordat with the Vatican which le-
galized two of the religious orders by name and (tone other." 
The Spanish bishops evaded this restriction by twisting it to 
mean one order for each diocese instead of one for all of 
Spain. The Law of Associations in 1887 required each order 
to register and apply for authorization. The bishops refused. 
After each attempt to curb the wealth and power of the re-
ligious orders, the regular clergy came back more powerful 
than before. The orders multiplied and increased their hold, 
until in 1930 there were 3,886 «communities" in Spain. Their 
accumulated power) the illegal existence of the majority, and 
the widespread conviction that they were working in devious 
ways to propagandize for political forces aroused increasing 
wrath. 
The Church has always kept a strong hand on the lives of 
the Spanish people. This control over their daily life went 
far beyond that established by the sacraments and the confes-
sional. The sale of indulgences prevailed down to the 20th 
Century. Influential journals, such as the leading newspaper, 
El Debate, have been under open or covert ecclesiastical control. 
Most important has been the control of education. This 
was absolute until 1857. Down to 1931, at least half of 
Spain's meagre school system was in clerical hands. The cen-
. sus of 1930 showed 45 per cent of the people illiterate. This 
compared with 4.3 per cent for the United States, and 4.2 
per cent for France. The attack upon Church control of edu-
cation was not primarily an anti-clerical move. It was simply 
a demand for education. 
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Church vs. Republic 
These are some of the reasons that the most Catholic of 
countries has a strong anti-clerical movement. The movement . 
is not new. Churches and monasteries were burned a century 
ago. But despite bursts of reform legislation in 1820, 1836, 
1868, 1887, and 1901, the privileges of the Church have per- . 
sisted. 
The republicans who came into power in 1931 once again 
took up the cudgels for reform. The measures proposed were 
along the lin~s of laws adopted long ago in countries influ-
enced by the Reformation. They included freedom of wor-
ship, separation of Church and State through disestablishment, 
nationalization of Church property, State control of education, 
marriage, divorce. These are not exceptional measures for a 
democratic regime. Most of them are written into America's 
own body of laws. But the Spanish Church threw its forces 
into the task of blocking this legislation, and electing a pro-
clerical government. 
Thus little was accomplished in the first years of the Re-
public. Perhaps the greatest success was in the field of educa-
tion. Fernando de los Rios states that during the first two 
years of the Republic, . when he was Minister of Education, 
10,000 new schools and 5,000 libraries were built. The pro-
gram to reform the Church was, however, generally blocked 
until the victory of the People's Fn?nt. 
The triumph of the People's Front was won in the teeth of a 
militant c1 erical opposition. .But the electoral victory merely 
gave the opposition a new form and made armed rebellion 
certain. The clerical leader, Gil Robles, announced the re-
bellion of July, 1936 four days before it actually began. 
ttResponsibility," he said, "will strike the whole parliamentary 
system and SEatter the very regime with mud, with misery and 
blood." 
This was no mere coincidence, for the evidence accumulates 
that the Catholic hierarchy is openly supporting the rebellion. 
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The careful correspondent of the Manchester Guardian re-
ports, tcA few members of the clergy have either openly sided 
with the forces of the republic or remained neutral during the 
fighting, but they are greatly in the minority." 
The support of rebellion and fascism by the leaders of the 
Church does not mean that the great rank and file of the people 
are anti-religious. Anti-clericalism, however, is definitely in-
creasing. It is being fanned by those priests who have revived 
the traditions of the curas guerrillefos-the «fighting priests." 
Some observers believe that priests would be much safer if 
they remained at their posts and threw away their revolvers, 
and that churches would be in far less danger if some church 
towers were not converted into machine-gun nests. 
The growth of anti-clericalism is not the central issue of the 
civil war. For it is clear that on the side of the loyalists there 
are thousands of devout Catholics, including many priests. 
The Basque Nationalists, for example, are reported to be so 
Catholic that they want freedom to sign a separate concordat 
with the Vatican. Moreover, the rebel ranks include not only 
staunch Catholics, but also Moors, who are staunch Moham-
medans, and Nazi CCvolunteers," who are Catholic, Protestant, 
or neo-pagan. Democracy, not ecclesiastical reform, is the 
central issue of the present death struggle. 
The peril to the Church in the identification of its interests 
with the rebel cause was sensed by The Commonweal, a lead-
ing Catholic journal in New York, which said editorially in 
August, 1936: ccSpanish fascism will be the antithesis of the 
radical social demands made by the revolutionists. Super-
ficially it will also oppose anti-clericalism because Fascism is 
traditionalistic and there is only Catholic tradition in Spain. 
But it will not liberate creative Catholic energies which have 
struggled to emerge during hundreds of years. Even if it 
wanted to, it could not. A right social order cannot be promul-
gated from on top." 
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The Army 
Revolutions may come and go, but armies persist. The 
character of the Spanish army must be appraised in order 
to understand the civil war. 
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I t was the generals who plotted and started the civil war 
which now lays Spain waste. The disloyalty of Spanish generals 
is no new thing. They have a sorry record, in which treason 
and reaaion dominate. In 1870, John Hay found that ««the 
Spanish army from general to corporal is penetrated with 
conspiracy." Three years later, to prove his words, one gen-
eral turned the tortes of the First Republic out onto the streets, 
and another proclaimed Don Alfonso king. The mental state 
of the military chiefs has not changed in the intervening 
decades. The generals were, and are, on the side of reaaion. 
Hardly more than a year after the proclamation of the second 
republic in 1931, General Sanjurjo launched a rebellion to 
overthrow it. 
In the days when Spain owned a substantial part of the 
Western Hemisphere, she needed an army to police this great 
empire. When the empire was taken from her, she kept the 
army-particularly the officers. It was not a large army com-
pared with contemporary European armies, but it was large in 
terms of Spain's needs and resources. Its external duties were 
light, for the British navy was pledged to defend Spain's neu-
trality. When outside duty was required, the Spanish army 
proved inept. The subjugation of the Riffs was too much for it, 
and proved impossible until the French troops intervened. The 
chief task of the Spanish army has been to quell internal dis-
orders. 
Composition of the Army 
The Spanish army is top-heavy with officers. The ratio of 
officers to men is about three times as high in the Spanish Army 
as in the French. It is this officer caste that gets all of the privi-
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leges and most of the pay. It is a caste drawn largely from the 
ranks of the owning classes. An army appointment was the 
suitable reward for the son of wealth. The army became the 
bulwark of conservatism. 
In sharp contrast to the parasitic officer-class is the conscripted 
rank and file. The ordinary soldiers are sons of the common 
. people. The graft prevalent in the upper grades has not been 
shared with them. They have often been inadequately fed and 
clothed. These facts are significant in view of authenticated 
reports of desertion~ from rebel ranks. 
The regular army is supplemented by the Civil Guard, with 
some 30,000 to 40,000 men, the best trained of the numerous 
police forces. It was organized a hundred years ago to fight 
bandits. Latterly it has been used more often to quell the revolts 
of peasants and industrial workers. The Civil Guard shares' the 
army's predilection for protecting the rights of the privileged. 
The army is also supplemented by mercenary troops created 
to police Morocco - the Foreign Legion and Moorish troops. 
These hardened veterans, renowned for their cruelty, were the 
spearhead of Franco's attack, until Hitler began shipping cCblond 
Moors" in substantial numbers. The colonial troops could be 
trusted as the regular troops could not, because they had little 
mind for politics, and because they knew how to handle gre-
nades and bayonets. The use of these mercenaries against 
Spaniards was a dangerous policy for Franco, for it aroused 
resentment against the rebellion to fever pitch. The employ-
ment of the colonials against the Asturian miners in 1934 alien-
ated large numbers from the Right parties. Their use in 1936 
. was a guarantee of the unpopularity of Franco's cause. 
Treason 
Many republicans foresaw the threat of treachery from the 
army, but they did not feel strong enough to remove the Damoc-
lean sword by purging the army. They tried to reduce the 
number of officers by offering liberal pensions. They formed a 
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'"'"A Tory.controlled 
arm y is perilous in a 
democracy/' 
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new corps, the Assault Guard, to defend republican order, 
which they hoped would eventually replace the Civil Guard. 
The People's Front victory last February sharpened the issue. 
Manuel .Azana knew that the army was full of potential rebels ~ 
he heard of monarchist and fascist plots. He knew this, but did 
nothing more than send some of the worst reactionaries to the 
colonies. Azana believed in the loyalty of Spaniards; he feared 
to provoke revolt. The officers' junta was allowed to perfect 
its conspiracy in army quarters and in the colonies, and to use 
the armaments accumulated in government stores. 
The price paid for such an undemocratic army is now only too 
well known. When the generals launched the rebellion in J ul y, 
they controlled the bulk of the armed forces. The defense of 
the Republic rested on the workers' militias, untrained and 
poorly armed. Thus far their defense has held, but at a terrific 
cost. One clear lesson appears. A tory-controlled army is peril. 
ous in a democracy. 
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Regional Autonomy 
T here is not one Spain, but several S pains. T his, too, 
must be understood in appraising the present confusion. 
The Spanish situation is further complicated by the fact , that 
there are within the geographic borders of Spain certain peoples 
who insist upon their separateness. This is preeminently true 
of Catalonia, and only less true of the Basque country and of 
Galicia. Ask a man from Bilbao his nationality-t< I am a 
Basque." Call a man from Barcelona a Spaniard and he quickly 
sets you right-HI am a Catalan." 
This regionalism which has always played a large part in 
Spanish history, and which plays an important role in the pres-
ent civil war, must be understood in terms of the isolation in 
which the Spanish peoples have lived. Spain's mountain ranges 
have not only isolated her from Europe. They have isolated 
parts of Spain from other parts. They have made her rivers 
unnavigable, and her roads difficult and costly. The highways 
were improved by dictator de Rivera's military program, but 
they are still very inadequate. The rail ways are in a chronic 
state of backwardness. There is, in proportion to territory, four 
times as much railroad trackage in Great Britain, Germany, and 
France as there is in Spain. 
The Spaniards, by and large, do not know each other. Even 
today the great majority live and die in the same locality. The 
exchange of people, goods, language, and customs, has not been 
strong enough to fuse the regional groups into one. 
The outlying regions were aroused to struggle for independ-
ence by the heavy hand of the central bureaucracy. The court 
magnifice1.1ce cost money. The elaborate police machinery for 
collecting the necessary tribute also cost money. And as the 
external empire and its wealth dwindled, the burden of taxes 
was placed more heavily on the C(colonies" within Spain. Au-
tonomous movements on the part of these regional divisions to 
lighten the load of taxation brought increased interference with 
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local rights and customs. Madrid, to millions of Spaniards, be-
came a synonym for despotism, for foreign oppression. 
But today, Madrid is the symbol of freedom for the regional 
minorities. Such is the change produced by the civil war. For 
the provinces see Franco's troops as a new phase of ancient 
despotism. They believe that the trenches of Madrid defend 
regional as well as national independence. Unity with Madrid 
is today the guarantee of autonomy, of regional freedom. The 
old antipathies go in the face of the common danger. Thus Vole 
read of strange anomalies: a Basque Nationalist sitting in the 
cabinet of the central government; Barcelona factories prepar-
ing munitions for the Madril en os ; the streets of the Spanish 
capital resounding with the march of crack Catalan troops. 
The Catalans 
The most vexing of these regional problems is that of Cata-
lonia-tcthe Spanish Ireland," it is sometimes called. There are 
more than 2,500,000 Catalans living in that Northeast corner 
of Spain. The great industrial city of Barcelona is the capital 
of Catalonia, as well as the chief port on the Mediterranean 
The claims and prides of the Catalans are many and vocal. They 
are proud of their language, a strange mixture of Spanish and 
French. For centuries the Catalans have fought for the right 
to print their newspapers in Catalan, to have their public schools 
conducted in Catalan, and to have the courts use the regioll(l.l 
language. Furthermore, the industrial economy of Cataloni .l 
sets it off from the rest of Spain. Half of Spain's industry is 
concentrated here. 
The demand for the autonomy of Catalonia is rooted in many 
centuries of independence or quasi-independence. Ever since 
the eighth century, the Catalans played off French and Spanish 
interests against each other, and in the playing managed to 
preserve much of their own freedom. However, during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Catalan liberties were badly 
clipped, the use of their language was sharply limited, and their 
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·coveted autonomy was little more than a gesture of hope. Not 
until the abdication of Alfonso XIII, and the establishment of 
the republic in 1931, did Catalonia win anything like the status 
·desired. 
Under the Republic, Catalonia became a Generalidad, an 
.autonomous region I within the Spanish state, with full freedom 
,of language, and local control over finance, police, justice, edu-
-cation and all social services. The reactionary government of 
Lerroux, after the ill-timed revolution of October 1934, sus-
.pended the agreement with Catalonia, appointed a governor 
,and imprisoned Luis Companys, the president of the Generali-
.dad, and many of his associates. Not until the victory of the 
People' s Front last spring did Catalonia win her independence. 
'Consequently, when the civil war broke in July 1936, the Cata~ 
lans stood faith full y behind the Madrid government. 
'The Basques 
The nex~ independent group within Spain are the Basques. 
'There are some 1,300,000 of them occupying the provinces of 
Biscay, Alava and Guipuzcoa and part of Navarre. There are 
.another 200,000 of them living across the French border. Where 
they originally came from, no one knows. That they are a dis-
-tinctly different people from either the Castilian or the French 
is clear. Their language is quite distinct from either French 
·-or Spanish, and has marked affinities with Eastern European 
languages. The peculiar governmental and social customs of 
-the Basques were quite generally respected until the middle of 
-the nineteenth century. They were permitted freedom of elec-
:tions, certain military exemptions; free trade and some hand 
-in their local finances. But these rights were greatly limited 
during the last decades of the 19th, and the first decades of the 
20th century. 
They won no new rights with the establishment of the re-
public, but with the advent of the civil war in 1936, the Basques 
nave been promised the fullest autonomy by the Madrid gov-
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ernment. In spite of their social conservatism and ardent 
Catholicism, the Basques support the Popular Front loyalist 
government. They see in that constitutionally elected govern--
ment the only hope for their ideals of autonomy. 
The Galicians 
The Galicians, 2,275,000 in number, occupy the northwest--
ern provinces of Spain, Coruna, Lugo, Orense, and Pontevedra. 
They too, demand autonomy. The Galicians are almost ex--
elusively small farmers and find it hard to organize for common 
aims. Nevertheless the Galicians are certain of the justice of 
their claims to separateness. They hold serious grievances. 
against the central government, chiefly on grounds of tariff dis-
criminations which loaded heavy assessments on the grain pur-
chases of the Galician farmer. Galicia is today in Rebel ha~ds, 
but guerrilla bands of peasants are reported to be fighting for 
their freedom behind the lines. 
I..:abor 
Today the industrial workers playa leading role. 
Organized labor did not emerge as a powerful, independent-
force in Spanish life until after the great war. The demands. 
of war gave a sudden fillip to the development of industry in 
Spain. But Spain was caught in all the bad habits of feudal 
lands. Bankers were usurers, and applied brakes to any-
healthy industrial development. Employers applied oppressive 
tactics. Wages were at starvation levels, living conditions--
were brutal, and all efforts to organize were met with swift' 
reprisals. Such conditions made inevitable the creation of a. 
revolutionary labor movement. In its first phase, this labor 
movement was heavily anarchistic. nDirect action" became its. 
slogan. The isolated character of industry gave strength to·· 
the hope of successful attacks on individual factories. Also,. 
the despotic character of the government encouraged such 
philosophy of violence. 
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In October, 1934, the 
miners of Asturias 
arose in revolt. 
In 1910 the bulk of anarchist and syndicalist movements 
were fused in The National Confederation of Labor which, 
before the rebellion, numbered some 600,000 to 700,000 trade 
unionists. 
These held aloof from the other trade union movements 
until the crisis of 1936 when many of the rank and file cast 
their votes for the People's Front. Not until the civil war was 
threatening Madrid were anarcho-syndicalists brought into the 
coalition government. . 
Labor leaders with socialist leanings, after years of effort 
emerged as powerful leaders when the republic was proclaimed 
in 1931. They formed the UGT (the general union of work-
ers) , which today has a membership of at least 1,000,000, and 
probably many more. This socialist labor union is dominated 
.by those of left-wing tendencies, conspicuously by Largo 
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Caballero, the present war premier. The socialist party, on 
the other hand, has been dominated by those of right-wing 
tendencies, notably Indalecio Prieto. 
The writing of new labor codes has been diligently pursued 
since 1931. The results on paper have been quite promising, 
but the results in performance have proved negligible. Feudal-
ism, which has persisted both in agriculture and in industry, 
resisted all change, especially the idea of recognizing union 
labor. The reaction which followed on the heels of the Oc-
tober, 1934 revolt made short work of the unions. Many 
labor leaders spent the months of 1935 in jail, and were not 
released until after the electoral victory in February,' 1936. 
Much of the power of the labor forces was lost through dis-
union. The anarcho-syndicalists of Barcelona, the commu-
nists, and the socialists used up valuable energy in cursing each 
other. Not until 1936, when the People's Front won so de-
cisive a victory at the polls, was unity achieved. The breaking 
out of the civil war in July, 1936 brought these left-wing par-
ties closer together, and it is these parties who unquestionably 
furnish the effective fighting core of the present Loyalist forces . 
The Civil War 
All of the forces which we have outlined center in the 
war which now rages. 
Who are fighting, and what are the issues? 
The Loyalist forces are mainly volunteer militias frorn 
civilian life led by that part of the army and police which re-
mained loyal to the constitutional government. They are 
common men and women from factory, farm, and office, who 
dropped their tools and took up arms at their government's 
call. 
They are fighting to save the Republic. They are fighting 
to save the People's Front government they elected last Feb-
ruary. They are fighting for the division of the land, for 
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separati~n of Church and State, for a democratic army, for 
the rights of labor, and for regional autonomy. Above all, 
they fight today for national independence. 
The Rebel forces are the bulk of the regular army and Civil 
Guard, led by a junta of generals, and supported by Moorish 
mercenaries, the fascist Spanish Phalanx, and the monarchist 
Carlists from Navarre. Behind this comparatively small but 
well-trained army are powerful interests: the majority of the 
Church hierarchy, the land-owners, and some of the indus-
trialists like Juan March, the tobacco king. 
Purpose of the Rebellion 
Their rebellion aims to restore the old oligarchy qf privilege 
by a military. dictatorship. Franco calls for ctthe establishment 
()f the severest principles of authority," Y/ords redolent of the 
Inquisition. The Infante Juan, 4eir presumptive to the Spanish 
throne, announces that the rebellion is based upon ct ancient 
principles of the sixteenth century and completely correcting the 
false democratic ideas of the nineteenth century." A Rebel cap-
tain promises, t tWe must teach our serfs such a lesson that they 
will know their place for the next hundred years." · 
This is the Rebel program. But the Spanish people have 
learned through bitter experience that there can be neither 
peace nor prosperity under feudalism. The ' issue is not be-
tween fascism and communism. The few communists in 
Spain support the government, but they are not the govern-
ment. The government is a cross-section of all those who 
want democratic institutions to prevail. 
The civil war is a struggle between a feudal fascism and 
,democracy. The present attempt to restore mediaevalism may 
turn Spain into a barren, blood-stained desert, but it cannot 
-quiet the voices of liberty and democracy. Loyalist Spain is 
saying, ttlt is better to die standing than live on your knees." 
Not only Spaniards die in Spain. The civil war is today a 
liqle world war on Spanish soil. German and Italian fascist 
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troops under Franco's banner storm trenches held by French, 
German, and Italian anti-fascists. Russian planes clash with 
Junkers and Capronis in the skies above Madrid. Spain may 
yet become the Belgium of another world war. 
Legal Precedent Is Broken 
According to international law, a legal and recognized gov-
ernment is entitled to aid in subduing rebellion. The Spanish 
government was elected in spite of attempts by the reaction-
aries to stay in power through fraud and coercion. And it 
was a recognized government. Precedent, however, has been 
reversed in the case of Spain. While Germany and Italy 
rushed airplanes, then munitions, and then Uvolunteers" to 
the Rebels, Britain and France denied aid to the Loyalists 
through the (tnon-intervention" agreement. It was not until 
the Rebels were besieging Madrid that men and munitions 
arrived in quantities from France, Russia and Mexico to help 
the Loyalists. There are many observers who think that a 
little aid to the government at the outset might have ended 
the rebellion quickly. But it is too late now to argue that case. 
The world struggle between fascism and democracy divides 
states and peoples over the Spanish civil war. Intertwined 
with the conflict of ideas is the struggle for colonies, for the 
Balearic and Canary Islands, for Spanish Morocco, and for the 
mercury, copper, and iron of Spain. German and Italian 
colonial ambitions now menace the colonial security of France 
and Britain. Thus, rival philosophies and rival imperialisms 
find a battleground in Spain. 
The American people sense the danger to our own peace and 
freedom in the Spanish war. In the interests of peace, the 
United States has officially decreed a strict ban on arms to both 
the Spanish government and the Rebels. If this neutrality 
helps to bring about genuine non-intervention in Spain, it will 
serve the cause of peace. But if it helps to establish another 
fascist rule, it will be a sorry day for both our liberty and 
peace. 
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The United States, faithful to its democratic ideal and hope, 
cannot be indifferent to the outcome of a war for human free-
dom. European democrats, like Lafayette and Kosciusko, 
made the American struggle for independence their own. The 
democracies are equally interdependent today. If peace and 
freedom are to be defended successfully they must be defended 
everywhere an attack is made upon them. 
" Two things at least we can do. We can study the roots and 
issues of the civil war, in the knowledge that an informed 
public opinion is in itself a mighty creative force. We can 
alleviate the suffering by sending medical supplies, food and 
clothing. 
The Spanish Loyalists fight democracy's battle. If they lose,. 
democracy loses. If they win, it is democracy's victory as well. 
There are many citizens of the United States, reluctantly ac-
cepting the logic of the proponents of neutrality, who wish 
nevertheless that the United States might find some way in 
which to strengthen the constitutionally elected government 
of republican Spain. 
• • 
TAKE YOUR STAND 
beside hard-pressed defenders of democracy in Spain. 
I 
Spain needs sugar, coffee, condensed milk, canned goods of 
all kinds, medicines, serums, surgical and Red Cross supplies, 
and warn1 clothing for men, women and children. 
Send your contribution to the 
NORTH AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO AID 
SPANISH DEMOCRACY 
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City 
BISHOP FRANCIS ]. MCCONNELL, Chairman 
REV. HERMAN F. REISSIG, Executive Secretary 
A postcard to the committee will bring you the address of the re-
ceiving station nearest you. 
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Readings on Modern Spain 
Books: 
Behind the Spanish Barricades, by John Langdon Davies. 
McBride, 1936, 275 pp., $2.75. 
"The best picture now available of what is going on in 
Spain."-John Gunther. 
Spain in Revolt, by Harry Gannes and Theodore Repard. 
Knopf, 1936, rev. ed., 235 pp., $2.00. 
A study of the political and economic causes of the civil war. 
T he Olive Field, by Ralph Bates. Dutton, 1936, 477 pp., $2.50. 
Lean Men, by Ralph Bates. Macmillan, 1935, 555 pp., $2.50. 
This like The Olive Field is a vivid novel of contemporary 
life in Spain. 
Pamphlets: 
Spain: Issues Behind the Conflict, by Charles A. Thomson. 
Foreign Policy Association, 1937, 10 pp., 25c. 
Spain Under the Republic, by B. W. Diffie. Foreign Policy 
Association, 1933, 11 pp., 25c. 
Spain, by American Friends of Spanish Democracy, 1937,23 pp., 
10c. 
Careful reports on the situation in Spain, signed by leading 
liberal American churchmen. 
Spain's Democracy Talks to Ame1tica, by North American Com-
mittee to Aid Spanish Democracy, 1936, 18 pp., 3c. 
Catholics and the Civil War in Spain, by North American Com-
mittee to Aid Spanish Democracy, 1937, 16 pp., 5c. 
Catholic declarations in support of the Spanish government. 
Spain: Church Against Republic, by Robert Neville. Spanish 
News Service, 3 pp., 2c. (Reprinted from New Republic) 
SPAIN 
rrOut of the murk of heaviest clouds, 
Out of the feudal wrecks and heap'd up 
skeletons of kings, 
Out of that old entire European debris, 
the shatter'd mummeries, 
Ruin'd cathedrals, crumble of palaces, 
tombs of priests, 
La, Freedom's features fresh undimm'd 
look forth - the same immortal face 
looks forth j 
(A glimpse as of thy Mother's .face 
Columbia, 
A flash significant as of a sword 
Beaming touJards thee.) 
rrNor think we forget thee maternal j 
Lag' d'st thou so long? Shall the clouds 
close again upon thee? 
Ah.. but thou hast thyself now appear' d 
to us, ti'e know thee, 
ThaI" hast given us a sure proof, the 
glim pse of thyself, 
Thou waitest there as everywhere for thy 
time." 
-Walt Whitman 
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